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SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND THE SYMBOLIC
POLITICS OF CORPORATION AS CONTRACT
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie

American corporations are structured in such a way that
shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote
in all significant corporate decisions. Over the years, this
exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an
ongoing procession of justifications. But as those arguments
have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have
circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special
voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental
feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of
freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate
constituents. Because this set of agreements reflects the
preferences of all parties to the corporate contract, they
contend, it should thus be viewed as the best way to structure
the corporation.
The thesis of this Article is that the “nexus of contracts”
theory is both descriptively wrong and normatively hollow,
and, in particular, provides a poor foundation for the
exclusive shareholder franchise. The corporation is neither a
mere contract nor a set of contracts, literally or
metaphorically. Indeed, the whole notion of the corporation
as a nexus of contracts has been a theatrical production of
dodges, feints, and posturing designed to rationalize and
justify the existing order of things and create the kind of
rhetorical space corporate law scholars need to advance their
own particular policy positions.
Once freed from the
constraints of false theories, it is time to do the hard work of
starting over and determining what the ideal structure or
structures might be for organizations that bring together
capital and labor in a process of joint production.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A corporation is a person—a legal person. Of course, the idea of
a corporation as an actual “person” has been roundly mocked as both
a ridiculous fantasy and a sinister power grab.1 But constitutional
law has long recognized that a corporation is a legal person and, as
such, has certain legal rights and duties.2 Given the pedigree and
notoriety of the “corporation as person” doctrine, it comes perhaps as
some surprise that this conception is almost entirely absent in
corporate law literature. Instead, ever since the law and economic
revolution of the 1980s, the reigning idea is that the corporation is a
contract, or alternatively, a nexus of contracts.3 Either way, the
implication is clear: corporations are nothing more than private
agreements between parties.4
1. See, e.g., Stephen Colbert, Hobby Lobby Case, COLBERT REP. (July 14,
2014), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/xivy3m/the-colbert-report-hobby-lobby-case
[http://perma.cc/NZT6-W5KM] (“Oh, and it’s probably not a big deal, but they also
ruled that corporations have religious beliefs.”).
2. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (“It
has been settled for almost a century that corporations are persons within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Note, The Personality of the
Corporation, 19 HARV. L. REV. 222, 223 (1906) (reviewing W. Jethro Brown, The
Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L. QUAR. REV. 178 (Oct. 1905))
(“The phenomenon of corporate personality does not fit into known legal
categories, but since it satisfies the test of personality in having capacity for legal
rights and duties, it is most natural to treat it as though it were a person, with a
slowly growing recognition that the analogy is more real than fictitious.”).
3. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939
(Del. Ch. 2013) (finding “the bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of
a binding broader contract among the directors, officers, and stockholders”); Jill
E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 373, 374 (2018) (noting that “scholars widely accept the utility of
the contract metaphor” in the corporate context).
4. See Fisch, supra note 3, at 375 (noting modern corporate law revolves
around the contractual approach).
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Over the years, corporate law scholars have relied on this view to
support many core features of modern corporate governance. To take
one example, corporations are structured in such a way that a single
group of constituents—shareholders—has the right to vote for the
governing board of directors and other significant corporate decisions.
All other corporate constituents—most notably employees, suppliers,
and customers—have their preferences captured through individual
contracts rather than by casting a vote. Although this exclusive
shareholder franchise has been supported by several different
arguments, prominent among them is the idea that the corporation is
a contract. Corporate law scholars argue that this fundamental
feature of corporate governance, like many others, is merely the
product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all
corporate constituents.5 As the exclusive shareholder franchise
reflects the preferences of all parties to the corporate contract, it
should be viewed as the best way to structure the corporation.6
The problem with this contention is that the corporation is
neither a contract nor a set of contracts. The idea is almost
nonsensical. Business organizations (including corporations) are
state law entities that have their own legal personality and internal
governance structure. If corporations were purely creatures of
contract, there would be no need for them under the law. Notably,
one of the truly salient features of corporations—limited liability—is
not contractual in nature. It is anti-contractual. Moreover, reducing
corporations to contractual components makes no theoretical sense.
The “theory of the firm” was developed to explain why some business
relationships were handled internally through a firm rather than
through contractual relationships within a market.7 Delaware, the
most popular state of incorporation, handles its corporate litigation
through its courts of chancery; contracts, in contrast, have long been
handled by courts of law.8
So why do courts and commentators rely on contract theory and
contractual metaphors when discussing corporations? The answer is
the symbolism of contract.
Because contracts are generally
considered Pareto optimal at the time of their making, they are
presumptively recognized as in the best interests of the parties and

5. See id. (noting that corporate participants are engaging in individualized
terms to customize their corporate governance).
6. See id. (highlighting contractual relationships benefiting the corporation
on “autonomy and efficiency grounds”).
7. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388
(1937).
8. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985) (observing that a major asset of the
state of Delaware is the experience and expertise of its judiciary in the area of
corporate law).
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the most efficient result.9 Arguing that corporations are contracts
therefore becomes a useful first step by creating the rhetorical space
to advocate for a particular policy position. The exclusive shareholder
franchise is just such a position. Having the nexus of contracts model
on your side of the debate is an effective weapon against adversaries.
What is particularly curious, then, is that this view of the
corporation-as-contract argument has been used to support a wide
variety of perspectives in the corporate law literature. Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel used the nexus of contracts theory as
a table-setter for their comprehensive law and economics approach to
corporate law.10 In their view, because the corporation acted as a
default contract for the parties involved, policymakers needed to
design the “hypothetical bargain” that worked best for all parties.11
They then offered their perspective on what tweaks to the current
system would best benefit the participants.12 From here, however,
the debate has split off into various camps, each using nexus of
contracts theory to support its side. Stephen Bainbridge argues that
the contractual approach supports Delaware’s status quo approach,
which favors strong managerial deference to the board of directors.13
More fervent contractarians, however, have argued that the public
corporation is far from the contractual ideal, and newer types of
business entities, like limited liability companies, more closely follow
the contractual model.14 Finally, shareholder activists have argued
that their “contract” with corporate management should provide them
with a more robust role in corporate governance.15
The corporation-as-contract rhetoric is simply part of the
symbolic corporate governance politics of the last half-century.16
Because corporations are not contracts, or contractual
9. See Bruce R. Lyons, Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory:
Inter-Firm Contracts, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 27, 28 (1996) (assessing that
business contracting has evolved to be an efficient response).
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989).
11. See id. at 1428 (noting that without a knowledge of the rights among
participants in the economy at any given time, default rules are difficult to
establish).
12. See id. at 1447 (“Each investor must live with the structure of risks built
into the firm. . . . It is all a matter of enforcing the contracts.”).
13. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002).
14. See e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 4 (2010).
15. See, e.g., NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVS., THE EFFECT OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM ON CORPORATE STRATEGY 3 (2016) https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs
/Shareholder_Engagement_Survey_Report_2016.pdf
(noting
a
rise
in
shareholder activism bolstered by increased contractual power through proxy
contests and board positions); DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS
SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON 1 (2018) (discussing the efforts of large
public-sector pension funds).
16. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics,
94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2014).
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agglomerations, it makes no theoretical sense to use that model as a
paradigm. But the rhetoric is used to support the continuing reign of
shareholder primacy, which is a cornerstone shared by all of the
“corporation as contract” proponents. Shareholders hold the voting
power exclusively because they have contracted for corporate control.
That power excludes any other would-be participants.
This Article asserts that the nexus of contracts theory is both
descriptively wrong and normatively hollow, and, in particular,
provides a poor foundation for the exclusive shareholder franchise.
Part II of the Article will describe the basic structure of American
corporations with special focus on the role of corporate voting. It will
then detail the rise and fall of two other arguments for the special
status of shareholders when it comes to voting. Part III, the heart of
the Article, will detail and critically examine the many, sometimes
overlapping versions of the corporation-as-contract. No version of this
theory, regardless of its motivation or particular features, stands up
to even casual scrutiny, and as such does not support the exclusive
shareholder franchise. Part IV will explore theories of the firm and
how they offer more nuanced and complete models for business
organizations than the nexus of contracts theory. None of these
theories of the firm provides specific justification for the exclusive
shareholder franchise as part of the firm. In the end, this final
argument for the exclusive shareholder franchise should be put out of
its misery, opening the way to a broader discussion of corporate
governance.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
American businesses conduct joint economic enterprises,
particularly large-scale ones, as corporations.17 Although a variety of
different business organizational forms exist, such as the
partnership, the limited liability company (“LLC”), and the sole
proprietorship, the corporation clearly dominates the economic
landscape.18 The corporation (or “company”) has been described as
“[t]he most important organization in the world . . . [as] the basis of
the prosperity of the West and the best hope for the future of the rest

17. See Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make up 5 Percent
of Businesses but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (2014),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62percent-revenues.
18. See id. (noting that only 5% of the organizational entities in the United
States are corporations, but 62% of organizational tax revenues come from
corporations).
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of the world.”19 The United States is exemplary of the broader global
approach.20
Under US law, corporations are legal entities that are created
through state corporate law.21 The process of forming a corporation
is relatively straightforward.
Generally, the incorporating
individuals must file a corporate charter, also known as the articles
or certificate of incorporation.22 The articles of incorporation provide
the firm’s basic structure, including the corporation’s name, the
identity of the incorporators, the corporation’s business, and the total
number of shares the corporation may issue.23 Other governance
structure provisions are not necessary for the formation of the
corporation but are allowed.24
Once the corporation is established, control shifts from the
entity’s incorporators to its board of directors.25 The board manages
the firm and has the ability to bind the corporation.26 Shareholders
typically select the directors at the annual shareholders meeting.27
Directors must act in the firm’s interests through certain fiduciary
duties, such as good faith and loyalty.28 However, they delegate the
actual job of running the business to the officers, primarily through a
hierarchy headed by the chief executive officer (“CEO”).29 This
structure—shareholders select the directors, who in turn select the

19. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA xv (2005); see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at
4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven business growth in the United States
since the Industrial Revolution.”).
20. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). Hansmann and Kraakman stated,
We must begin with the recognition that the law of business
corporations had already achieved a remarkable degree of worldwide
convergence at the end of the nineteenth century. By that time, largescale business enterprise in every major commercial jurisdiction had
come to be organized in the corporate form, and the core functional
features of that form were essentially identical across these
jurisdictions.
Id.
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2018).
22. See, e.g., id.
23. Id. § 102(a)(1)–(6).
24. E.g., id. at § 102(b)(7) (limiting the liability of directors for breaches of a
fiduciary duty); id. at § 141(d) (staggering the board of directors).
25. Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill &
Brett McDonnell eds., 2012).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2).
27. Id. § 211(b).
28. Bodie, supra note 25, at 86.
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized
under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be
stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not
inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .”).
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officers to run the corporation—represents the foundation of
corporate law.
When a corporation is up and running, it encompasses the daily
activities of a variety of different players inside and outside the main
lines of control. The officers choose executives, who in turn oversee
managers and employees. There are also outside “stakeholders” who
have interests in the activities of the corporation: bondholders,
suppliers, customers, even the community at large. The interests of
most of these constituents are captured in contracts that spell out
their (largely) economic relationship with the corporation.30
Employees work under contracts of employment; suppliers provide
materials and services under supply contracts; and customers buy
products and services under sales contracts. All of these constituents
are vital players in the life of a corporation. But when it comes to
selecting members of the board of directors, one group of constituents
is privileged above all others. Shareholders, and shareholders alone,
vote in corporate elections. So why are shareholders the only group
granted the right to vote?
A.

Background on the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise

The primary normative justification for shareholder voting is the
theory of shareholder primacy.31 Shareholder primacy is the
theoretical driver not only for the vote, but also for such key concepts
as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Shareholder primacy
essentially means that corporations exist to serve the interests of
shareholders.32 Put more specifically, the theory mandates that the
corporation be run with the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.33
Shareholder primacy could simply be viewed as a democratic
legitimacy argument: the corporation has to keep shareholder
interests at the forefront because shareholders are the voting polity.
But this puts the cart before the horse: after all, who made the
shareholders the voting polity? The choice of this group as the
enfranchised citizenry is what needs justifying. A variant of this
justification is that shareholders are the corporation’s “owners” and
thus are entitled to the ownership rights of profits and control.34
However, the ownership justification is also doomed by its circularity:

30. Bodie, supra note 25, at 90.
31. Much of this Subpart recounts arguments made at greater length in
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 472–76 (2008).
32. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
277 (1998) (“The structure of corporate law ensures that corporations generally
operate in the interests of shareholders.”).
33. Id. at 278.
34. The classic example of this perspective is Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13,
1970, at 32–33, 122–26.
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who made the shareholders the “owners”?35 As corporate law
commentators have convincingly pointed out, shareholders simply
purchase a set of rights from the corporation.36 The right to vote is
made part of the stock ownership “bundle,” but a stock could be
constructed (and has at times been constructed) without the right to
elect directors.37 Even shareholders with the right to vote do not
possess many of the rights that traditionally accrue to property
owners—the right to exclude, for example, or the right of possession.38
Labeling shareholders “owners” is no more of a justification for the
vote than is labeling them “voters.”
Thus, shareholder voting is not the result of shareholder primacy.
It is, instead, simply one of its reinforcing mechanisms. Of course, as
has been dogma since the seminal work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means, the shareholder vote in publicly-held companies has not been
a particularly effective way of maintaining shareholder primacy.39
Shareholder votes have generally been an empty exercise in
rubber-stamping the slate of candidates nominated by the board. But
this is an oversimplification. At the level of closely-held corporations,
shareholder votes are a much livelier affair. Here, shareholder
primacy is generally effectuated directly by the shareholders
themselves through the vote. Even in publicly held companies, a
majority, or even a properly situated minority shareholder, has the
power to appoint its representatives to the board and thus control the
corporation’s fate.
It is primarily the power of a “controlling” interest40 that drives
the law and economics of shareholder voting. At a traditional publicly
held corporation, the individual shareholder has little or no
motivation to monitor the company or even vote in the election.41 But
when those votes are amassed together into a controlling interest,
they can vote out the current board, often immediately.42 The

35. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002) (“[T]he claim that shareholders
own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”).
36. Id. at 1192.
37. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The
One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 694 (1986)
(discussing the practice of selling shares without the right to vote).
38. Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93
VA. L. REV. 733, 754 (2007).
39. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932).
40. A majority will have de jure control, but a minority interest may also
have de facto control over the corporation. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys.,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Del. 1994) (finding ownership of 43.3% of shares to
be a controlling interest).
41. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 474.
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2018) (allowing a majority of shareholders
to execute any action that may be taken at a shareholders’ meeting, including
removal of directors, through a written concurrence of those shareholders).
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shareholders’ votes can be amassed through the mechanism of a
tender offer—an offer by one entity to buy 50% or more of the
company’s shares.43 The market for corporate control imposes the
discipline necessary to effectuate the shareholder primacy norm.44 If
the shareholders are ignored or unhappy, they can sell their shares
to another entity that can agglomerate the shares into a majority
holding.45 This new majority holder then can take complete control
and attempt to make the profits that prior management had failed to
generate.46 In this way, the market for corporate control leads to
greater efficiency: the shareholders can sell their shares at a
premium, and the acquirer can realize the benefits of control.47 This
potential for market discipline keeps the board and management
focused on the shareholders’ interests.48
All these explanations, however, are little more than
recapitulations of the way corporate law currently operates. In order
to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise, something beyond mere
labels (“shareholders are owners”) or descriptions of the current
mechanics of corporate law (“shareholder voting relies on the market
for corporate control to effectuate shareholder primacy”) must justify
the exclusive shareholder franchise. Corporations, after all, are
collective enterprises with a range of constituents, all of whom
contribute to and benefit from the activities of the firm. Shareholder
primacy, and the exclusive shareholder franchise that comes with it,
needs to be justified in some non-circular fashion. There have been a
few arguments that go beyond mere labels and investigate these
questions. Two of the most prominent are the argument from the
residual and the argument from Arrow’s Theorem.
B.

The Argument from the Residual

In their foundational work The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel attempt to ground
shareholder primacy in standard economic theory, arguing for it in
terms of creating the highest level of efficiency or overall social
utility.49 They believe that maximizing shareholder wealth would
43. See Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the
Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 460 (2005) (detailing how voting control
can be obtained through during hostile take overs by purchasing a majority of the
company’s stock).
44. Jonathan R. Macey, Market for Corporate Control, LIBR. ECON. &
LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/MarketforCorporateControl.html.
45. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 475.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Edelman & Thomas, supra note 43, at 454 (discussing the importance
of shareholder votes in the takeover setting).
49. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991). Many of the arguments in the book were first
made in an earlier article: Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
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generate the highest amount of surplus, and thus would result in the
greatest overall social utility.50
Instead of justifying wealth
maximization by labeling shareholders as the “owners” of the
corporation, nexus of contracts theory treats shareholders as just one
set among many contractual partners.51 Nevertheless, shareholders
are unique as the sole “residual claimants” because their returns are
not payable until the other contractual participants—creditors,
employees, customers, suppliers—have been fully satisfied.52
This perspective assumes that all other claimants have rigid
contractual entitlements, and that shareholders are not paid until all
other claimants receive their appropriate contractual entitlements.
As such, all participants in the corporate nexus benefit from the
maximization of the residual. As Easterbrook and Fischel write:
As residual claimants, shareholders have the appropriate
incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions. . . . Those with
fixed claims on the income stream may receive only a tiny
benefit (in increased security) from the undertakings of a new
project. The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains
and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have the
right incentives to exercise discretion. 53

This allocation of the residual justifies the exclusive shareholder
franchise: the board of directors should have its eye on the residual,
and they know their positions are at stake if they fail to deliver for
the shareholders. The same theory also applies to the market for
corporate control: the holders of residual rights should make the
decision over whether they sell control over the corporation to an
outside entity. The residual provides the appropriate incentives to
shareholders to maximize their returns while leaving the other firm
participants to their contractual rights (and remedies).54
A logical consequence of the residual theory of shareholder
primacy is the notion of “one share, one vote.”55 The idea behind “one
share, one vote” is that each individual share of stock has equal voting
weight with all other shares. This is done to ensure that each share’s

Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 408 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook &
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law]. We will refer to the book when similar
arguments are made in both places. Much of this subsection recounts arguments
first made in Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at 473–76.
50. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 35–39.
51. Id. at 36.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 68.
54. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73
J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965), for a discussion of the importance of the market for
corporate control to shareholder wealth maximization.
55. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 73 (“Votes follow the residual
interest in the firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an
equal voting right, there will be a needless agency cost of management.”).
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voting interest is equal to the share’s interest in the residual.56
Shares with disproportionate voting power would create skewed
incentives: those with control would have the incentive to seek gains
outside of the residual, in ways that do not inure proportionately to
the other owners of the residual.57 Because of these skewed
incentives, the residual would no longer be maximized.
The principle that all shareholders—that is, all voters in the
corporate franchise—have equal interests in the residual is
foundational to the idea of the exclusive shareholder franchise.
Because maximizing the residual maximizes the return to
shareholders while leaving all other stakeholders contractually
satisfied, shareholder control over the corporation will improve social
welfare by focusing on increasing the corporation’s residual profits.
Shareholder primacy is enforced through shareholder voting and by
the market for corporate control, which uses the shareholder vote to
effectuate changes in management. This connection between the
residual and control, as calibrated by the “one share, one vote” rule,
appears to set up the proper incentives for maximizing the residual.
But this argument is missing one crucial link: a reason why
shareholders should be assigned the residual in the first place. Why
shareholders? After all, any of the corporation’s stakeholders could
be assigned the residual and would theoretically then have the
appropriate incentives.
Easterbrook and Fischel have an answer to this question.
Shareholders are best positioned to be assigned the residual because
they have relatively homogeneous interests in wealth
maximization.58 They explain that shareholders are likely to have
“similar if not identical” interests because “the shareholders of a given
firm at a given time are a reasonably homogenous group.”59 And they
argue that this homogeneity is critical to the success of shareholder
primacy. First, it gives all shareholders an equal interest in the
residual, and thereby an equal incentive to monitor agency costs so
as to reduce conflicting incentives.60 Second, limiting the interests of
56. Id.; see also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model
of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945–46 (1996) (“The case for the one
share, one vote rule turns primarily on its ability to match economic incentives
with voting power and to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on
bad management.”).
57. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 851–52 (2006)
(discussing concerns that controlling shareholders without a commensurate
economic stake in the corporation are more likely to “tunnel” away a
disproportionate share of firm value).
58. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 70.
59. Id.
60. Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 775, 776 (2005) (noting that the notion of “one share, one vote” is based on
“agency costs considerations”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech,
Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
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the residual holders to the residual itself provides shareholders with
the same interests and thereby the same objectives for the firm.
Otherwise, voters will have conflicts between preferences that will
muddy the governance waters and lead to irresolvable disputes over
corporate policy. Easterbrook and Fischel, along with others, have
argued that this consistency amongst voter preferences is the key to
the stability and prosperity of the corporate form.61
The argument from the residual, then, largely rests on this claim
of shareholder homogeneity. It is what makes this discussion of the
shareholder residual into a meaningful normative theory, rather than
a simple restatement of positive corporate law. While it is true that
shareholders, under modern corporate law, have contractual
entitlement to the residual, this does not explain why they should
have it. One could imagine assigning the residual to any one of the
corporate constituents, and then giving it the voting rights as well, in
order to maximize the residual and generate the greatest amount of
social utility. Capital contributors could all be contractually assigned
a fixed rate of return, as other constituents are under the current
structure.
(Bondholders already get something like this.)
Easterbrook and Fischel believe that shareholders are best suited for
this because their preferences are so alike, much more alike than
those of other constituent groups, and certainly more than any
combination of groups.
This assumption of shareholder homogeneity, however, has come
under quite a bit of pressure over the last couple of decades. Many
types of shareholders have interests in the firm that go beyond a
simple desire to maximize the residual, including majority
shareholders, shareholders with disproportionate voting rights,
members of voting trusts, bribed shareholders, hedged shareholders,
sovereign wealth funds, and employee and management
shareholders. The list goes on and on.62 In each case, those particular
shareholders have interests that threaten to override their shared
interest in the residual.
Moreover, shareholder heterogeneity is not simply a matter of
shareholders with discrete competing interests. There is also
heterogeneity amongst otherwise similarly situated shareholders
with respect to their definitions of wealth maximization.
1103, 1121 (2002) (noting that any rule other than one share, one vote “wastefully
increases the agency costs associated with the corporate form”).
61. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 69–70; see also HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 62 (1996) (“Investor-owned firms
have the important advantage that their owners generally share a single
well-defined objective: to maximize the net present value of the firm’s earnings.”).
62. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 31, at Subparts III(A)–(G); see also Iman
Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1258–59 (2008) (discussing how activist shareholders may seek to
advance their own interests to the exclusion or detriment of other shareholders’
interest).
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Shareholders may have very different time horizons for their
investments.63 A flash trader looking to capitalize on a minute
change in price is different than a pension fund manager looking to
fund the retirements of state employees. There is also the question of
diversification: to what extent is the shareholder seeking to maximize
this individual stock or, instead, maximize the entire portfolio? This
divide has led some commentators to suggest a normative system of
portfolio wealth maximization, rather than share wealth
maximization.64 Correspondingly, shareholders have different risk
preferences and may have different tastes for the corporation’s
approach to risk based on the ratio of their holdings in the individual
firm compared to their overall holdings.65
Finally, even if
shareholders agree on the goal of wealth maximization and share risk
and time horizon preferences, they still might very well disagree
about strategic business choices the corporation makes in these
areas.66
This is all to say that a key assumption in the argument from the
residual has turned out to be wrong. Shareholder interests are
actually quite heterogeneous. And even if shareholders are thought
to at least be more homogeneous than other groups (such as
employees), or certainly more so than any combination of
shareholders and another group, exponents of the residual argument
have never really made the case that there’s some kind of smooth,
inverse relationship between preference homogeneity and firm
63. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power,
53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 579–83 (2006) (discussing the different financial interest
of short-term and long-term shareholders).
64. Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate
Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43, 44 (1996); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1021, 1056 (1996) (discussing the differences between the fictional
shareholder envisioned by corporate law and actual shareholders who are
generally portfolio investors).
65. For example, a middle-class investor on the brink of retirement will have
different risk preferences than a young hedge fund manager with billions under
management, even if both have $25,000 worth of shares in the same company.
The declining marginal utility of wealth also means that the performance of the
company has less effect on the utility of the hedge fund manager, even though
both have the same number of shares.
66. For example, Hewlett-Packard shareholders battled over the wisdom of
the merger between Hewlett-Packard and Compaq. Michael Brick & Steve Lohr,
Fiorina Claims Victory in Hewlett-Compaq Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19,
2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/20/business/technology-hewlettpackard-claims-a-victory.html; see also Lauren Hirsch, P&G Says Shareholders
Reject Peltz’s Bid for Board Seat by Slim Margin, Activist Says Vote a Dead Heat,
CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:33 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/10/proctergamble-shareholders-vote-against-adding-nelson-peltz-to-board.html (discussing
a closely divided vote at Proctor & Gamble regarding a director proposed by
activist shareholders who advocated for the company to streamline its structure
and make small acquisitions of innovative brands).
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function. They’ve also never pointed to some tipping point—some
non-smooth point at which the firm slips into chaos. And they’ve long
ignored the fact that other constituents—most prominently, workers
with firm-specific skills—also have incomplete contracts and residual
interests in a corporation.67
As the argument from the residual came under greater scrutiny,
corporate law scholars began to look around for other potential
justifications for the exclusive shareholder franchise. They didn’t
have to look very far. Easterbrook and Fischel made a second
argument: that shareholder voting is also compelled by the teachings
of social choice theory.68 In particular, they and other like-minded
scholars focused on Arrow’s theorem, the crown jewel of social choice
theory, to take issue with expanding the corporate electorate to
include anyone besides shareholders.69
C.

The Argument from Arrow’s Theorem

The argument from Arrow’s theorem was first made by Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in their article on corporate voting70
and later recounted in their book on the economic structure of
corporate law.71 Citing Kenneth Arrow’s groundbreaking work in
social choice theory, they explain:
The voters, and the directors they elect, must determine both
the objectives of the firm and the general methods of achieving
them. It is well known, however, that when voters hold
dissimilar preferences it is not possible to aggregate their
preferences into a consistent system of choices. If a firm makes
inconsistent choices, it is likely to self-destruct. Consistency is
possible, however, when voters commonly hold the same
ranking of choices (or when the rankings are at least singlepeaked).72

Easterbrook and Fischel then argue that shareholders have relatively
homogeneous preferences—they are all interested in profit

67. Margaret Blair has forcefully argued for the neglected importance of
workers’ interest in the residual. See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
27 (1995); Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the
Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 67 (Margaret M. Blair &
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment:
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738–39 (2006).
68. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 49, at 403–
04.
69. Id. at 405–06.
70. Id.
71. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 69–70.
72. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 49, at 405
(citing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND COLLECTIVE VALUES (2d ed. 1963);
DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958)).
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maximization.73 The corporate franchise, therefore, should be limited
to this class of like-minded participants.74
So, what is Arrow’s theorem? The theorem is the centerpiece of
a broader enterprise known as social choice theory.75 Social choice
theory attempts to explain how individual preferences are aggregated
into social choices.76 It focuses upon the social choice functions—
usually some type of voting procedure—used to move from individual
preferences to social choices.77 Arrow’s theorem holds that no social
choice function can simultaneously satisfy four relatively
undemanding conditions of democratic fairness (non-dictatorship,
Pareto efficiency, universal domain, and independence from
irrelevant alternatives) and guarantee a transitive outcome.78 A
transitive outcome just means that, with respect to the social
preference order: if A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A must be
preferred to C.79 The contrary—an intransitive preference order
where A is preferred to B, B to C, and C to A—is referred to as a voting
cycle, and indicates that the social choice function is unable to declare
a winner, at least one that is meaningful.80
As applied to corporate voting, then, the argument from Arrow’s
theorem may be described as follows. The theorem explains that
73. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 70.
74. Id. This is also, Easterbrook and Fischel mention, the reason why the
law makes little effort to require firms to pursue goals other than profit
maximization. Id. at 69–70.
75. Social choice theory, and Arrow’s theorem, have mainly come into legal
scholarship under the guise of public choice theory. For summaries of the
literature, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38–39 (1991), and Saul Levmore, Foreword to MAXWELL
L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY, at xi–
xiv (1997).
76. See Levmore, supra note 75, at xi–xii.
77. Id. at xii.
78. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE & INDIVIDUAL VALUES ch. 3 (2d
ed. 1963) (laying out the logical foundations and conclusions for the theorem); see
also NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 19–
23 (1978) (summarizing the assumptions, conditions, and conclusions of the
theorem); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 62–65 (1986) (providing a concise outline of a proof of the theorem).
Some of the terminology in this section is drawn from WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 293–98 (1982). For a good
summary of the state of social choice theory and Arrow’s theorem, see 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, at ix (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
2002).
79. See RIKER, supra note 78, at 119, 297.
80. See Grant M. Hayden, The Limits of Social Choice Theory: A Defense of
the Voting Rights Act, 74 TUL. L. REV. 87, 101–02 (1999) (describing intransitivity
as a voting cycle and explaining the problems with a system displaying this
characteristic); Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some Implications of Arrow’s Theorem
for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1995) (defining intransitivity and
stating that it may in essence lead to dictatorial power being exercised in a social
choice function by way of agenda control).
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there is no corporate voting procedure that meets the four fairness
conditions and, at the same time, guarantees an acyclical outcome.
Something—either one of the fairness conditions or a guaranteed
transitive outcome—must give. For example, adhering to the
condition of universal domain by allowing those with preferences that
are dissimilar in certain ways to vote in corporate elections could
result in inconsistent corporate decision-making, which, in turn,
would cause a corporation to, in Easterbrook and Fischel’s terms, “self
destruct.”81 Relaxing the condition of universal domain by restricting
the vote to a class of participants with similar individual preferences
would avoid such an outcome.82
Shareholders, given their
homogeneous interest in profit maximization, fit the bill.83
This argument has been very influential in the decades since its
initial formulation. Henry Hansmann, for example, uses it to argue
against allowing every group of stakeholders to have representation
on a corporate board of directors: “because the participants are likely
to have radically diverging interests, making everybody an owner
threatens to increase the costs of collective decision making
enormously.”84 Among these costs: the possibility of a voting cycle,
which “increases as preferences among the electorate become more
heterogeneous.”85 Similarly, Gregory Dow worries that employee
representatives
may
introduce
the
possibility
of
“voting . . . pathologies.”86 This argument for exclusive shareholder
franchise has even been cited by scholars like Margaret Blair and
Lynn Stout, whose “team production” theory of corporate governance
does not otherwise demand it.87 The perceived power of the argument
from Arrow’s theorem, then, is such that a fairly wide variety of
corporate scholars rely upon it.
The problem, though, is that the argument from Arrow’s theorem
was deeply flawed from the very beginning.88 Its shortcomings do not
stem from some vulnerability in the theorem itself, but instead from
its application to the social choice function in question—corporate
board voting. We note initially that the argument from Arrow’s
81. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 70.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 69–70.
84. See HANSMANN, supra note 61, at 44.
85. Id. at 41–42.
86. Gregory K. Dow, The New Institutional Economics and Employment
Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 57,
69 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
87. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 257 (1999). In their model, people who hope
to profit from team production give up some of their rights to the corporation and,
in return, the corporation coordinates the activities of the team members and
allocates the resulting production in a way that minimizes shirking and rentseeking. Id. at 264.
88. See generally Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the
Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219 (2009).
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theorem shares a central premise with the argument from the
residual—that shareholders have homogeneous preferences with
respect to wealth maximization. But, as discussed above, this
premise has come under increasing scrutiny because shareholders
have interests that diverge along a number of dimensions. The
presence of heterogeneous shareholder preferences undercuts a
crucial assumption of the argument from Arrow’s theorem.
Even with the assumption of shareholder homogeneity, there are
many other reasons why Arrow’s theorem fails to provide a suitable
foundation for restricting corporate voting to shareholders alone.
First, shareholder agreement on the goal of wealth maximization,
even if true, does not indicate agreement on how best to achieve that
goal.89 Shareholders may, and often do, wildly disagree over the
proper course of action for their corporation. And even if shareholders
were to agree on the direction for their corporation, they may have
very different ideas about which directors would best effectuate it.
Because Arrow’s theorem operates on the level of individual
preference orders over an array of alternatives (here, director
candidates), agreement on the general goals or methods of the
corporation does little to ensure that a particular voting system for
board membership will be free from Arrovian intransitivities. It just
operates at the wrong level.90
Second, the argument ignores the fact that avoiding all possible
voting cycles comes at great cost. Remember, Arrow’s theorem
demonstrates that no voting procedure can simultaneously fulfill the
four conditions of democratic fairness and guarantee a transitive
outcome, but it says nothing about which condition should be
sacrificed. That decision depends on an assessment of the costs
associated with sacrificing one of the conditions of democratic fairness
and, on the other side, the practical likelihood and costs associated
with intransitive outcomes. Restricting voting rights to shareholders
because of their purported agreement with each other is a
straightforward violation of the condition of universal domain. That
condition demands that a voting procedure work with every
permutation of voter preferences over a set of alternatives. And like
the other fundamental requirements of democratic fairness, universal
domain is relatively uncontroversial. Giving up this condition—by
restricting individual preference orders—runs counter to the
fundamental democratic principle that people should not be ineligible
to vote because of their preferences; it also runs counter to a

89. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory
of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 665 (1996) (discussing various explanations, such
as investment time and tax bracket, for disagreement over how best to achieve
the goal of wealth maximization). If there was complete agreement, there would,
of course, be no reason to have board elections in the first place, since we could
just ask one of the shareholders to report the shared preference ranking.
90. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 88, at 1230–32.
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fundamental principle of standard economics to take people’s
preferences as they come. There is something deeply wrong about
“solving” a problem of preference aggregation by deciding not to listen
to certain people. But, more broadly, the point here is that the case
for sacrificing universal domain comes with tremendous costs.91
Third, the argument from Arrow’s theorem fails to analyze the
likelihood or cost of intransitive corporate election outcomes. As it
turns out, the likelihood of cyclical outcomes, even when voting is not
limited to shareholders, is probably quite small, and the cost of such
outcomes, when they do occur, is negligible (and certainly not likely
to cause corporations to “self destruct”). Empirical observations
across a broad range of voting mechanisms have failed to discover the
large number of intransitivities initially predicted by social choice
theory.92 This is probably because those early predictions were based
on the assumption that all individual preference orders were equally
likely to occur in a preference profile—that individual preference
orders were somehow randomly distributed.93 They are not, and
when more real-world preferences are considered, the likelihood of
voting cycles considerably declines.94
Moreover, even when voting cycles do occur, there is no reason to
think that they will lead to inconsistent firm choices. A nascent
intransitivity does not automatically translate into an unstable
outcome, because there are many features to corporate (and political)
elections that operate to produce stability. For example, most
corporate board voting procedures are structured to produce a winner
regardless of the presence of lurking intransitivities. Board elections
generally only require the vote of a plurality to win; as long as a
director gets one vote, in some cases, she will win if unopposed.95
91. See id. at 1232–34.
92. See Scott L. Feld & Bernard Grofman, Partial Single-Peakedness: An
Extension and Clarification, 51 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1986) (explaining that
“empirical observations of a wide variety of actual collective decision-making
processes indicate that cyclical majorities are very rare”); Bernard Grofman,
Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a
“Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1553 (1993) (noting that
cycles are much harder to find than early Social Choice models have predicted).
93. See Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Weisberg, A Mathematical Solution
for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting, 13 BEHAV. SCI. 317, 321 (1968).
94. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 88, at 1234–39.
95. Joshua R. Mourning, Note, The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing
Shareholder Disenfranchisement in Corporate Director Elections, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1143, 1144 (2007). Some shareholders have pressed corporations to change
their voting rules so that a director must win a majority of the votes cast in order
to win the seat. See id. at 1143–46 (discussing this movement). However, even
under such a “majority-vote” regime, a director who fails to get a majority will
stay on until a replacement is chosen or until the majority of shareholders vote
to remove the person. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2018) (stating that
“[e]ach director shall hold office until such director’s successor is elected and
qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal”). However, some
companies have established resignation policies which require directors to resign
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Some boards have staggered seats, in which directors have three-year
terms, and only one-third of the directors are elected in any given
year.96 In cases where there actually are top cycles, the candidate
selected by the voting procedure may, indeed, be the contingent
product of that process. But the voting procedures themselves, and
the “structure-induced” equilibria they produce,97 would ensure that
the firm would not suffer for lack of directors. In addition, even
assuming a complete board turnover, the subsequent board members
presumably would know the recent history of the firm’s decisions, its
current situation, and whether it is now in the firm’s interest to
change course. In other words, the board members would be able to
exercise independent judgment as to whether their original plans for
the firm still make sense in the current situation. (Indeed, Jeffrey
Gordon claims that cycling at the board level is, for this and several
other reasons, very unlikely.)98 Proponents of the argument from
Arrow’s theorem have not connected the long series of points between
a board election cycle and a self-destructive firm.99
The argument from Arrow’s theorem for the present state of the
corporate franchise is flawed at many levels. Shareholders do not
have homogeneous interest in profit maximization. Even if they did,
it would not directly translate into the kind of agreement on
candidates necessary to avoid intransitive results in corporate
elections. Further, even if shareholder homogeneity did translate
into the requisite agreement on candidates, restricting voting rights
to shareholders involves sacrificing a fundamental condition of
democracy in a situation where the likelihood and impact of
intransitive results is already negligible.
This argument for
restricting corporate voting rights to shareholders, then, is far from
compelling.
For several decades, these two arguments—from the residual and
from Arrow’s theorem—provided the theoretical support for the
exclusive shareholder franchise. The main debates over corporate
voting moved on to the details: What, exactly, should shareholders be
voting on? How responsive should the electoral mechanisms be? How
should shareholder power be balanced against board authority? But
as the two underlying arguments began to break down, corporate
scholars began to rely on a final argument, one that has long been
if they are not elected by the shareholders. Mourning, supra note 95, at 1182–
85. For criticism of majority voting as an ineffective reform, see Vincent Falcone,
Note, Majority Voting in Director Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Swift Solution?,
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 844, 881–82 (2007).
96. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (allowing such a staggered
election procedure).
97. See generally RIKER, supra note 78, for some background on structureinduced equilibria.
98. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 372–73 (1991).
99. See Hayden & Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem, supra note 88, at 1239–43.
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used to justify many other aspects of corporate governance. This is
the argument that the corporation, and all of its governance
structure, is merely a product or reflection of freely bargained-for
contracts.
III. CORPORATION AS NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
As discussed above, most corporations share the same
fundamental governance characteristics.100 The firm is controlled by
a board of directors, who in turn select the officers who run the dayto-day business of the operation.101 This board is elected by
shareholders.102 The shareholders share in the profits of the
corporation through dividends and can sell their shares on the open
market.103
This same basic structure—shareholders electing
directors who then appoint officers—may be found in every public
corporation.104 Why is this tripartite power dynamic so uniform
across corporations? Is it because corporate law requires this
structure, or because this structure is freely chosen and therefore the
most efficient?
For contractarians, the answer is that corporate constituents
freely choose the basic features of corporate governance. The nexus
of contracts theory, in its purest form, holds that a corporation is
merely a central hub for a series of contractual relationships.105 In
other words, a firm is a “legal fiction”; it is not an individual and has
no real independent existence.106 Instead of thinking of the
corporation as an independent entity, the nexus of contracts theory
breaks it down into its component parts.107 These parts are the
contractual relationships between the various parties involved with
the firm: shareholders, directors, executives, creditors, suppliers,
customers, and employees.108 Under this approach, corporate law is
an extension of contract law and should focus on facilitating the
interrelationships between contractual participants in the most
efficient manner.109

100. Gordon, supra note 98, at 373–74.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The same is true of closely-held corporations, although the roles overlap
to a great extent.
105. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 309 (1976).
106. Id. at 310–11.
107. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation:
A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 411 (1989) (defining the “nexus of
contracts” approach as “the firm is a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set
of contracting relations among individual factors of production”).
108. Id. at 418.
109. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1444.
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While we’ve noted before that the preferences of corporate
constituents are captured through a mix of voting (shareholders) and
fixed contracts (everyone else), the contractarian argument goes
beyond this description. It grounds this basic division (and other
aspects of corporate governance) in the free contractual choices of
corporate participants. The exclusive shareholder franchise is, then,
part and parcel of this set of contracts. And because it is seen as part
of an interlocking set of free choices of all of the participants, it is
therefore the most efficient way to structure the enterprise. To
question the corporate governance structure is to dispute the market
choices of those who are, presumably, in the best position to make
them.
The nexus of contracts theory has been extremely influential in
shaping corporate law theory over the last four decades.110 But
despite its dominance, there is still confusion over whether the theory
is a descriptive model, a normative prescription, or some combination
of both.111 Michael Jensen and William Meckling presented it as a
positive theory of the corporation and its concomitant
relationships.112 That thread was picked up in the legal literature,
with Easterbrook and Fischel cementing the concept in place.113 But
they too have waffled over whether the model should be seen as a
positive description or as a normative framework—or both.114
The nexus of contracts theory has been sufficiently successful
that its branches have grown in several different directions off of the
same trunk. We start with the strong contractarians who most closely
adhere to the idea that a corporation is and should be considered a
110. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 9 (“The dominant model of the corporation
in legal scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989) (“Critics and
advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has in
the last decade swept the legal theory of the corporation.”); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 (1993) (arguing that
“the nexus-of-contracts view of the modern corporation and the principal-agent
explanation of some important aspects of the firm . . . have had profound
implications for some of the most important issues of corporation law”).
111. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999)
(“Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse the positive proposition that the
corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements with the normative proposition
that the persons who constitute a corporation should be free to make whatever
reciprocal arrangements they choose, without the constraints of any mandatory
legal rules.”).
112. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 310–11.
113. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006) (describing Easterbrook and
Fischel as “the primary expositors of the contractarian theory”).
114. Id. at 783 (“Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory of corporate law is both
normative and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it
‘almost always’ does.”).
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contract or set of contracts. Second, we take a look at the
“hypothetical bargain” popularized by Easterbrook and Fischel, as
well as managerialists who use the theory to support the boardcentered status quo of traditional Delaware law. Finally, we explore
the influence of “the corporate contract” on recent debates about the
power of shareholders within the corporate structure.
A.

Strong Contractarians

In their article Agency Costs and a Theory of the Firm, Jensen
and Meckling set out the straightforward proposition that “most
organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a
set of contracting relationships among individuals.”115 Rather than
seeing the firm as something different in the economic landscape,
Jensen and Meckling sought to remove the fictional conception of
organizational identity to expose the network of relationships
beneath.116 They argued that:
[I]t makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things
which are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from
those things that are ‘outside’ of it. There is in a very real sense
only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts)
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor,
material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.117

In a sense, Jensen and Meckling are correct: corporations are
fictional legal entities without individual corporeal or spiritual
existence. But to claim they are merely an agglomeration of contracts
is a legal simplification too far. They are forced to hedge their position
when talking about corporations, rather than “most organizations,”
as they state:
The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction
which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which
is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims
on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can
generally be sold without permission of the other contracting
individuals.118

Notice the framing: there are claims on assets and cash flows “which
generally can be sold” without permission. The passive voice elides
the exact mechanics, but even Jensen and Meckling admit that these
transfers take place without contractual sanction from all parties.
Rather, the corporate structure is doing the basic work of managing
these flows of claims and cash. And they do not even mention basic

115.
116.
117.
118.

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 310 (italics omitted).
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 311.
Id. (italics omitted).
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aspects of the corporation such as fiduciary duties, the board’s
managerial power, or limited liability.
In truth, it is unfair to put too much weight on the two pages of
Jensen and Meckling’s article that gave birth to the nexus of contract
theory. The article itself focuses on the agency costs between
shareholders and managers, provides an economic model designed
around the difference in interests between shareholders and
managers, and interrogates the use of debt and inside equity to
balance these interests.119 But as subsequent theorists have
recognized, the nexus of contract theory is not a theory of the firm.120
It is, instead, an illustrative set-up for an article that focuses on a
theory of corporate capital distribution.
Despite the thinness of Jensen and Meckling’s claims, their
literal take on the nexus of contracts approach has found adherents
in the legal literature.
Advocating for a strong version of
contractarianism, these commentators argue that the corporation is
primarily contractual, and as such it represents terms that the
parties have freely chosen amongst themselves.121
Since the
corporation is merely an intersection of voluntary agreements,
corporate law should eschew mandatory rules.122 Instead, the role of
corporate law is to create default terms that line up with the standard
terms for which the parties would bargain. And since the terms have
been freely chosen, we can presume they are efficient.123
The strong descriptive claim is the nexus of contracts theory in
its purest form. The corporation is entirely the product of freely
bargained-for contracts.
These contracts, not corporate law,
determine the structure of corporate governance. But this literal
119. Id. at 312–57.
120. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691,
692 (1986).
121. But it is sometimes difficult to parse the language of the theory to
determine what is actually being claimed. See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 11
(“I have come around to the view that the corporation is a nexus of contracts in a
literal sense, albeit a very limited one.”); Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership
and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 919 (“[A]lthough it may be technically
accurate to describe a corporation as a nexus of contracts, it is entirely
inadequate.”).
122. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 856, 860 (1997) (“The nexus of contracts model has important implications
for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious of which is the debate over
the proper role of mandatory legal rules.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The
Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397
(1989) (noting that corporate law contractarians argue “that the contractual view
of the corporation implies that the parties should be totally free to shape their
contractual arrangements”).
123. A more nuanced version of this would be: having the parties choose their
terms is the system most likely to lead to an efficient result over time, as there is
no other system likely to result in greater efficiency.
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version of the corporation-as-contract claim is simply incorrect.
Corporations are not creatures of contract. One cannot contract to
form a corporation.124 The individuals involved must apply to a state
for permission to create such an entity. The fact that this permission
is readily granted (as long as fees and taxes are paid) does not change
the fact that permission is required.125
Corporate contractarians chafe at the idea of permission, because
such permission has been used in the past as justification for
corporate regulation.126 The idea of concession theory is that
corporations only exist thanks to a grant—a concession—by the state,
and the state is thereby justified in extracting a quid pro quo for the
concession. The history of early business entities reveals that such
entities were in fact specific grants of authority by the crown over
industries, territories, infrastructure, or trading routes.127 Like the
nexus of contracts theory, concession theory is both positive and
normative: it provides a descriptive theory of corporation based on
state creation and argues that the state should have a freer hand to
regulate corporations because of this creative power.128
Contractarians have been particularly vicious and dismissive in their
rejection of concession theory.129 But the basic premise is sound:
corporations are creatures of the state and cannot be formed purely
through contract. It is impossible to do so.130

124. This fact is acknowledged by contractarian theorists. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 10, at 1444–45 (acknowledging that statutory corporate law
is necessary to create a corporation).
125. Cf. Bratton, supra note 107, at 445 (“If the corporation really ‘is’ contract,
as the new economic theory tells us, then the last doctrinal vestiges of state
interference should have withered away by now. . . . But the sovereign presence
persists.”).
126. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 208
(2004) (“This state-creation characterization effectively sets a presumption in
favor of regulating corporations that does not apply to other business associations
or contracts.”).
127. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the
History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 893 (2000) (“The ‘concession’ theory
of the corporation in the English-speaking world owes its lineage to two
aggressive assertions of the sole right of government to create legal persons:
Coke’s decision in 1615 and the Bubble Act in 1720.”).
128. Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV.
327, 329 (2014) (looking “to ‘rehabilitate’ concession theory, which views the
corporation as fundamentally a creature of the state and thus presumptively
subject to broad state regulation”).
129. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, LIMITED
LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68–69 (2016) (“[I]t has been over halfa-century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic stripe, took
the concession theory seriously.”); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The
Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 775 (1989) (“There
is no longer any justification for regarding the corporation as a concession of the
state.”).
130. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 11.
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Having to acknowledge this factual reality, contractarians then
contend that corporate law statutes are mostly default rules, not
mandatory rules that might interfere with private bargains struck
through contracts. But there is one critical feature to modern
corporate law that is not a default rule and could not be reproduced
through contract: limited liability. In The Rise of the Uncorporation,
Larry Ribstein described corporate limited liability as the result of a
grand bargain: “[t]he corporate form represents a quid pro quo: big
firms get corporate features, and government gets an opportunity to
regulate governance.”131 The corporate tax—characterized as “double
taxation,” since dividends are taxed as well—was “in a sense a fee for
incorporating.”132
In return, the corporation’s investors were
protected by limited liability. As Ribstein makes clear, limited
liability is distinctly non-contractarian: “Limited liability is
particularly important because, unlike other corporate features
discussed above, partnerships could not easily contract for it without
lawmakers’ cooperation as they have to include the creditors in these
contracts.”133 Because limited liability is a feature “that parties
cannot replicate by private contract[,] . . . whether a statutory form
provides for limited liability therefore will dominate parties’ choice of
form.”134 In sum, limited liability is the main reason why the
corporation succeeded where the partnership failed.135
Despite the factual errors endemic to the theory, the literal
interpretation of the nexus of contracts approach does important
rhetorical work for strong contractarians.
By divorcing the
corporation from the state, contractarians render efforts to regulate
the corporation as outside interference and illegitimate.136 In this
libertarian approach to corporate law, government can then be cast
not as the creator of the corporate form, but rather its opponent.137 If
131. Id. at 66.
132. Id. at 99.
133. Id. at 79.
Although he recognizes that there may have been
(cumbersome) contractual methods for limiting liability for contractual
claimants, it would have been “impossible” to secure limited liability against tort
claimants without the government’s help. Id. This thinking is a departure from
Ribstein’s earlier contentions that limited liability could somehow be rendered
contractual. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 129, at 775 (“Nor does state concession
status flow from limited liability of shareholders as against involuntary creditors.
Limited liability is merely a consequence of the shareholders’ contract, just as it
is of participants in other arrangements, such as non-partner creditors.”).
134. Id. at 138. The importance of limited liability is a theme Ribstein turns
to over and over again in the book. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 5, 8, 10–11,
25, 37, 43–44, 72, 79–85, 95–97, 99–101, 120–21, 127, 138–47, 153, 162, 164–65,
256.
135. Discussing the characteristics that are specific to corporations, Ribstein
notes that “partnerships long have been able to contract for such corporate-type
features, with one critical exception—limited liability.” Id. at 76.
136. Id.
137. Mahoney, supra note 127, at 874 (arguing that “the state, far from
facilitating organizational development, often tries to thwart it”).
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corporations are contracts, government should step back and let the
private parties create their nexus; any effort to intervene would
interrupt and interfere with the market process. This applies to the
shareholder vote as well. Contractarians need not come up with an
independent justification for the shareholder franchise if that
governance structure is simply the outcome of private ordering.
Particularly if seen as a “nexus” of contracts, the corporation’s
exclusive shareholder voting structure can be cast as a joint and
consensual arrangement between all of the participants in the
corporate form. Creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees—all
have agreed to the shareholder franchise because none of them
included voting rights in their contracts.
Of course, the irony is that state corporate law has likely stifled
efforts to expand the franchise beyond shareholders. A truly
free-flowing contractual approach to governance would open the door
to a variety of corporate forms, instead of the directors-shareholders
structure that is so ensconced in the law. If corporations were truly
just an agglomeration of separate deals, it’s unlikely they would all
look the same. But corporate law has successfully put its stamp on
governance, particularly on the shareholder franchise. It is one of the
reasons that a true contractarian like Larry Ribstein seemed to give
up on the corporate form in favor of the limited liability company.
The range of choices that do appear within the statutory
framework are often illusory. For example, section 141 of Delaware
General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) states: “The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”138 This apparent flexibility, however, is belied by the
actual structure of most corporations and the presence of other
mandatory requirements.
In practice, corporate charters are
extremely homogenous.139 The diversity that one might expect from
a collection of firms with heterogeneous governance needs is nowhere
apparent.140 Moreover, the apparent flexibility of corporate law on
paper is undercut by a more complex reality. The textual openness of
section 141(a), for example, masks a fairly rigorous defense of
managerial power. Shareholders’ power to amend the corporation’s
bylaws under section 109(b) of the DGCL takes a back seat to the
more free-ranging power of section 141(a).141 In addition, many

138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
139. Klausner, supra note 113, at 784, 786–91.
140. Id. at 784.
141. John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation Shareholder
Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1353 (2001) (“A bylaw
is impermissible if its primary purpose is to prevent or interfere with the board’s
discretion under section 141(a) to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation . . . .”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and
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aspects of federal securities law, particularly SEC Rule 14a-8142 and
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,143 assume the existence of certain
governance mechanisms, such as the board and shareholder
meetings, before adding additional requirements.144 Centralized
management is “[t]he feature that best characterizes the large-firm
nature of the corporation,” and the board of directors is “one of the
most distinctive features of the corporate form.”145 Similarly,
shareholder voting, transferable shares, fiduciary duties, and capital
lock-in are other essential “governance” elements of the corporation
that are mandatory to the form.146
There is another, less ambitious form of contractarianism that
acknowledges
corporate
law’s
imposition
of
mandatory,
noncontractual terms but argues that participants nonetheless
exercise a kind of contractual freedom by choosing the corporate form
over others. Businesses need not choose the corporation as their
organizational form; they can create general and limited
partnerships, limited liability companies, and other variations.147
But the availability of choice amongst a set of possible forms does not
mean that the choice is contractual. For a variety of reasons, the
corporation is the best (or only) choice for certain types of
businesses.148 Although the number of choices has increased, there
are still only a handful of options. At best, there is an argument that,
of the existing options, the participants who do the choosing seem to
prefer the corporate form. This, though, doesn’t justify the most basic
aspects of corporate governance, such as the exclusive shareholder
franchise. A similar argument could be made for the many businesses
Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 428–
44 (1998).
142. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8 (2018).
143. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
144. For example, Rule § 240.14a-8 gives shareholders the authority to
propose actions to the board at the annual meeting, and Sarbanes-Oxley puts
independence requirements on audit committees, which are subcommittees of the
board. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. III 2003).
145. RIBSTEIN, supra note 14, at 67 (arguing that “only a corporation must
have a board of directors that is separate from the executives and appointed
directly by the owners”).
146. Id. at 68–75.
147. See id. at 26–27. Another new and increasingly popular form of business
association is the benefit corporation. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate
Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 612 (2017) (“Currently, thirty states and the District of
Columbia have passed benefit corporation statutes, and seven additional states
have legislation pending.”).
148. These reasons include: the complexity of drafting LLC or LLP charters;
tax treatment of LLCs can be more difficult for many investors to manage; the
unavailability of tax-deferred stock swaps for LLCs; the difference in treatment
of equity compensation for executives and employees; and differences in state tax
treatment.
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in Germany, with its system of codetermination, who have chosen to
locate or remain in Germany and give workers a vote and a seat at
the boardroom table.149
Although sometimes the rhetoric slips,150 it is hard to find strong
contractarians who believe that the nexus of contracts theory is the
literal truth.151 The theory is instead used metaphorically to present
a narrative about the operation of the firm. Under this narrative, the
corporation represents the contracts that the parties would have
made had they been able to do so. This brings us to the “hypothetical
bargain.”
B. Corporation as Metaphorical Contract: The Hypothetical
Bargain
Even if corporations are not actually a nexus of contracts, maybe
all the participants would have agreed to the structure used within
corporate governance in the absence of all the pesky, real-world
transaction costs that would bog down such decisions and otherwise
limit free choice. The idea behind this argument is the hypothetical
bargain. Though invoked by many scholars, the hypothetical bargain
has been most forcefully articulated by Easterbrook and Fischel.152
In trying to explain the presence of corporate law in what should—to
them—be a world of pure contract, they maintain that “corporate law
is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in
corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting.”153 They
continue:
There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing
quorums, and so on, that almost everyone will want to adopt.
Corporate codes and existing judicial decisions supply these
terms “for free” to every corporation . . . . Corporate law—and in
149. See Dieter Sadowski et al., The German Model of Corporate and Labor
Governance, 22 COMP. LAB. & POL’Y J. 33, 36–40 (2000).
150. It is difficult to measure the extent to which contractarians shift their
metaphor into the realm of literal truth. Certainly, most contractarians will
admit that a corporation cannot be formed through contract. However, the theory
is often described in shorthand as a positive description. See, e.g., JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES MADE, PROMISES KEPT 22 (2008) (“It
has long been recognized . . . that the corporation . . . should be viewed as a
‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts.”); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 769, 781 (2006) (“[I]t is commonplace and correct to say that the
corporation is a nexus of contracts . . . .”).
151. Fred McChesney, for example, stated: “Admittedly, as a descriptive
matter state corporation codes and other sources of law contain many mandatory
terms that parties cannot contract around . . . . [T]o claim that contractarians
would deny the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of blindness or
stupidity.” Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate
Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989).
152. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 34.
153. Id.
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particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the
blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have
bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able
to transact costlessly in advance.154

Thus, in situations where certain features of a corporation cannot be
grounded in actual bargaining of any sort, they are justified as the
product of an imagined, ex ante bargain among members of the many
corporate constituencies.155
The hypothetical bargain provides three rhetorical moves to
these quasi-contractarians. First, the theory captures much of the
rhetorical power of the more direct nexus of contracts theory without
the illogical commitments that the unalloyed version of the theory
requires.156 Second, the theory allows supporters to defend current
practices by pointing to their roots as bargains (even if only
hypothetical ones).157 Third, it provides the intellectual support for a
corporate law architecture that includes default and mandatory
terms.158 Judges and legislatures are permitted to impose terms if
the participants in the corporation would be better off, as long as the
narrative supports a hypothetical bargain that would arrive at the
same place.
Because the hypothetical bargain is based on a “best guess” as to
what the parties really want, the success of the contractarian
argument depends on how well this guess matches reality.
Contractarians spend at least some time trying to figure out the
preferences of corporate constituents. They look to actual bargains
on certain subjects. And they make some simplifying assumptions
about human motivation and behavior. The problem with these
approaches is that the actual bargains are often limited to more minor
features of corporate governance negotiated between a few
constituents, and the simplifying assumptions are often off that
mark. In the end, the hypothetical bargains, and the imagined
preferences they are based on, reveal much more about the desires of
those doing the guessing than people’s actual preferences.
Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, believe that they have a
“ready source of guidance” when it comes to making their guesses:
154. Id.
155. See also Bainbridge, supra note 122, at 865 n.31 (explaining that
“corporate default rules . . . [are not] entitlements but . . . our best guess as to
what parties would rationally agree to in the absence of any pre-existing set of
imposed terms”); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and
Economic Analysis, 84. NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (claiming that many
features of non-contractual corporate law were trivial because they represent
terms that would have been in corporate charters or bylaws anyway).
156. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 15.
157. Id. (“The rhetoric of contract is a staple of political and philosophical
debate. Contract means voluntary and unanimous agreement among affected
parties. It is therefore a powerful concept.”).
158. Id.
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“the deals people actually strike when they bargain over the
subject.”159 Legislatures and courts, then, should build corporate law
by looking at the bargains struck by private actors in similar
situations. This seems fine when working out some of the details. For
example, there are good reasons to assume that minority
shareholders will want protections against opportunism from
majority shareholders—ones that already exist or that assume power
in the future. But it’s hard to see how this works when it comes to
the more fundamental aspects of corporate governance structure,
such as who has voting and control rights. There really aren’t any
guiding bargains over these more basic aspects of governance because
we never have a bunch of atomistic providers of capital and labor
floating around in the æther of free contract making such deals. The
grand hypothetical bargain requires us to visualize all of the
corporate constituents sitting around a table negotiating the ideal
governance form ex ante. But by the time most of the actual
constituents come to the bargaining table, the basic governance
procedures have already been selected by the founders—they’ve
approached the state and formed a corporation. There’s no real-world
analog that allows us to discern much of anything about the form that
corporation would take. The “deals people actually strike” are of little
use here.
Without the guidance of real-world bargains on the basic aspects
of corporate governance, contractarian scholars are forced to take a
step back, consider the preferences of all constituent groups, and then
argue from those preferences to the hypothetical bargains. Here, the
best Easterbrook and Fischel can do is assume that “[i]nvestors and
other participants agree on the stakes: money. They therefore would
agree unanimously to whatever rule maximizes the total value of the
firm.”160 For them, every single corporate constituent group—
shareholders, employees, creditors, and customers—agrees on the
goal of wealth maximization. Again, most scholars and lawmakers
making these guesses have tended to focus more specifically on the
preferences of shareholders. But they’ve largely made the same
guess—that shareholders want to maximize wealth.161 And these
guesses, and the hypothetical bargains based on them, are used to
justify a broad range of the features of corporate law and governance.
Here, though, we have a guess to test against reality to see if it
makes sense. It doesn’t. The guess isn’t even accurate when it comes
to shareholder preferences. As we saw above, there’s no reason to
think that every shareholder has the same type of preferences—their
preferences are much more heterogeneous than previously
159. Id. at 34.
160. Id. at 23.
161. For a critique, see Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should
Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248
(2017).
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believed.162
Indeed, even shareholders who prioritize wealth
maximization may still disagree about what, exactly, that means, the
proper timeline, and other issues. And when we expand our gaze to
other participants, the guess looks even more off the mark.
Employees, for example, care about their wages, but they also care
about the long-term health of their companies and their jobs.
Customers care about the cost of their products (and, all things
considered, like them lower rather than higher), but they also care
about the quality of the goods or services they purchase. The
normative force of the hypothetical bargain disappears if the bargain
is not based on the actual preferences of corporate constituents.
But even if Easterbrook and Fischel are right about the
preferences of corporate constituents—even if every last one of them
values money above all else—that alone doesn’t lend much insight
into the hypothetical bargains they would make. Different corporate
constituents may want to strike deals that maximize their own
group’s wealth, not necessarily the overall wealth of the firm. And
even if you could convince all constituents that the only way to make
a deal is to agree to a system that maximizes the value of the firm,
that alone doesn’t automatically get you a hypothetical bargain on
any particular governance feature. There still exists an argument
that a particular governance structure is the right one to achieve that
shared goal, which brings you back to the original arguments you
were seeking to avoid. Is a structure that gives shareholders alone
the right to elect board members the best way to maximize the value
of a firm? Maybe or maybe not. But it depends on the particulars of
the situation, not on any actual or hypothetical agreements.
At this point, it should be clear that the hypothetical bargain is
an empty concept.
It’s really just an opening that allows
contractarians to try to link various governance features, including
the exclusive shareholder franchise, to “free choice” and all its
normative goodness. The bargain doesn’t do any work by itself and
may be used to justify virtually any corporate feature. As Jonathan
Macey explains, “the analytical framework that the contracting
paradigm provides for non-contractual law is not much of a constraint
on policymakers, since virtually any decision that a judge makes can
be justified as being consistent with the hypothetical bargain.”163 As
a justification for the shareholder franchise, the hypothetical bargain
ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Of course, the hypothetical bargain serves the same rhetorical
purpose as the nexus of contract theory: it makes the existing
arrangements seem like a voluntary agreement among the parties.
By viewing corporate law as a mere reflection of what the parties
would have bargained for, proponents of the hypothetical bargain can
achieve a twofer: set corporate law as they desire but then claim that
162. Id.
163. MACEY, supra note 150, at 29.
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such arrangements represent the will of the participants. Ultimately
the whole enterprise seems absurd. But the rhetoric enables these
commentators to keep their “private ordering” priors while meddling
when the parties do not play the game as expected.
C.

The New Corporate Contract

The metaphor and rhetoric of contract have enjoyed recent
application in discussions surrounding the “corporate contract”
between shareholders and the board. Taking the idea behind the
general nexus of contracts theory, the corporate contract approach
views interactions between shareholders and management as
primarily contractual in nature. In this instance, the “corporate
contract” analysis has been extended to the specific mechanics of
corporate governance: corporate charters and bylaws.164 Also known
as the articles or certificate of incorporation, the corporate charter is
the foundational document for the corporation and sets forth the basic
structure of its governance, such as the board of directors and the
creation and allocation of shares.165 Bylaws govern interstitial rules
of governance that can directly impact specific types of procedural
actions or decisions.166 They both provide tools for these stakeholders
to change the rules through which the corporation is governed.
Courts and commentators have come to characterize these
instruments of governance as the corporate contract.167 As described
in one recent Delaware case, “the bylaws of a Delaware corporation
constitute part of a binding broader contract among the directors,
officers, and stockholders formed within [the state’s] statutory
framework.”168
164. Id. at 18.
165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2018) (describing the contents of a certificate
of incorporation).
166. Id. at § 109(b) (“The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”). In Delaware, the
charter is more difficult to amend, as it requires both shareholder and board
approval. Id. at § 242(b)(1). Bylaws, in contrast, can be created and amended by
the board or by shareholders. Id. at § 109(a).
167. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del.
2010) (describing bylaws as “contracts among a corporation’s shareholders”);
Robert Borowski, Combatting Multiforum Shareholder Litigation: A Federal
Acceptance of Forum Selection Bylaws, 44 SW. L. REV. 149, 150 (2014) (finding
that “bylaws are generally treated as contracts between corporations and their
shareholders”). See generally Verity Winship, Litigation Rights and the
Corporate Contract, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW
KEEPING UP? (William Savitt et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913745 (describing the corporate contract as “the
agreement or set of agreements that articulate the terms of the relationship
among shareholders, directors and the corporation itself”).
168. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939
(Del. Ch. 2013); see also id. at 955 (“In an unbroken line of decisions dating back
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The idea of the corporate contract is generally used to justify the
parties’ use of charter amendments or bylaws as part of the rules of
the game. Commentators have argued that shareholders should have
broad rights to propose and enact bylaws as part of their “contract”
with the corporation.169 With a flurry of activity over bylaws
concerning proxy access, forum selection, majority voting, advance
notice, and litigation expenses,170 parties are hotly contesting the
degree of deference that courts must provide. In recent cases,
Delaware courts have upheld bylaws concerning forum selection171
and litigation fee-shifting.172 In these decisions, the courts have
leaned heavily on the notion that these bylaws are part of the
corporate contract between the shareholders, the board, and the
corporation.173 However, Delaware did find that shareholders lacked
the authority to propose a bylaw requiring the corporation to
reimburse reasonable proxy solicitation expenses.174 The Supreme
Court found that the bylaw improperly conflicted with the board’s
broad powers to manage the corporation.175
Once again, we find the idea of the corporation as contract being
used as a metaphor, and not a very useful one at that. First, charters
and bylaws are instruments of governance. There is no need to layer
the additional metaphor of “contract” on top of what are clearly
mechanisms for managing relations between the parties. The whole
point of having a system of governance is to create a mechanism
beyond simple contracts that structures the relationships between
the parties. As Delaware recognizes, bylaws themselves are supposed
to focus on procedural matters rather than substantive business
matters.176 They clearly relate to governance.177 If the legitimacy of
several generations, our Supreme Court has made clear that the bylaws
constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware corporation and its
stockholders.”).
169. D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (proposing to “empower shareholders in public
corporations by facilitating their ability to contract” through bylaws).
170. See Fisch, supra note 3, for a discussion of these bylaw controversies.
171. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
172. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014).
173. Id. (“But it is settled that contracting parties may agree to modify the
American Rule and obligate the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s fees.
Because corporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a corporation’s shareholders,’ a
fee-shifting provision contained in a nonstock corporation’s validly-enacted bylaw
would fall within the contractual exception to the American Rule.”);
Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955.
174. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008).
175. Id. at 232.
176. Id. at 236; Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 951 (noting that “bylaws typically do
not contain substantive mandates, but direct how the corporation, the board, and
its stockholders may take certain action”).
177. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 651–52 (2008) (describing shareholder bylaw
proposals as “an increasingly important part of battles over corporate
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the particular bylaw is in question, it can be justified through the
nature of the democratic process through which it was enacted. There
is no need to layer the additional idea of “contract” on top of the
system of governance.178
Second, the rhetoric of corporate contract has been used
inconsistently to support a variety of different approaches to
governance. Commentators often cite the corporate contract to
advocate for a hands-off or laissez-faire approach to
shareholder-proposed bylaws.179 Because the corporation allows
shareholders to implement procedural rules in their own interests,
corporate law should generally presume their enforceability.
Delaware courts, however, have used the corporate contract rhetoric
to justify board-enacted bylaws that arguably limit shareholder
rights. For example, in Boilermakers v. Chevron Corp.,180 the
Chevron and FedEx boards of directors adopted forum-selection
bylaws naming Delaware courts as the exclusive forums for
shareholder litigation.181 Shareholders then sued to render the
bylaws invalid.182 The Delaware Chancery Court upheld the bylaws,
relying in part on the idea of corporate contract.183 Then-Chancellor
Leo Strine explained:
In an unbroken line of decisions dating back several
generations, our Supreme Court has made clear that the bylaws
constitute a binding part of the contract between a Delaware
corporation and its stockholders. Stockholders are on notice
that, as to those subjects that are subject of regulation by bylaw
under 8 Del. C. § 109(b), the board itself may act unilaterally to
adopt bylaws addressing those subjects. Such a change by the
board is not extra-contractual simply because the board acts
governance” and “a useful way for shareholders to guard against board
opportunism without going too far in usurping board authority”); Ben Walther,
Bylaw Governance, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 399, 404 (2015) (stating that
under the bylaw governance model, “shareholders may exert authority over
corporate affairs by promulgating bylaws that circumscribe the board's exercise
of its authority”).
178. At times the language in Delaware opinions seems to be referencing the
idea of a “social contract” to justify the governance by the consent of the governed.
See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 955–56 (“Stockholders are on notice that, as to those
subjects that are subject of regulation by bylaw under 8 Del. C. § 109(b), the board
itself may act unilaterally to adopt bylaws addressing those subjects. Such a
change by the board is not extra-contractual simply because the board acts
unilaterally; rather it is the kind of change that the overarching statutory and
contractual regime the stockholders buy into explicitly allows the board to make
on its own.”).
179. Fisch, supra note 3, at 375 (“The contractual approach has become
particularly influential in supporting deference to the participants’ agreed-upon
governance terms on both autonomy and efficiency grounds.”).
180. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
181. Id. at 937.
182. Id. at 938.
183. Id. at 939.
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unilaterally; rather it is the kind of change that the overarching
statutory and contractual regime the stockholders buy into
explicitly allows the board to make on its own. In other words,
the Chevron and FedEx stockholders have assented to a
contractual framework established by the DGCL and the
certificates of incorporation that explicitly recognizes that
stockholders will be bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by
their boards. Under that clear contractual framework, the
stockholders assent to not having to assent to board-adopted
bylaws. The plaintiffs’ argument that stockholders must
approve a forum selection bylaw for it to be contractually
binding is an interpretation that contradicts the plain terms of
the contractual framework chosen by stockholders who buy
stock in Chevron and FedEx. Therefore, when stockholders
have authorized a board to unilaterally adopt bylaws, it follows
that the bylaws are not contractually invalid simply because the
board-adopted bylaw lacks the contemporaneous assent of the
stockholders.184

Although acknowledging the argument “that board-adopted bylaws
are not like other contracts because they lack the stockholders’
assent,” the Chancellor dismissed it as “a failure to appreciate the
contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware
corporations and their stockholders.”185
It is almost a magic trick: take the shareholders’ complete lack of
power over a forum-selection clause and turn it into a contract.186
Delaware even seems to allow the board to overturn a bylaw that the
shareholders have enacted to restrain the board.187
If this
relationship is contract, it would be an illusory one.188 There are
certainly valid normative reasons for constraining shareholder power
and preserving board authority.189 But, cloaking such policymaking
under the guise of corporate contract allows the court to make the
shareholders responsible for their own disenfranchisement. A cynic
might even add that Delaware inconsistently deploys the contract
metaphor to suit its own purposes. Forum-selection bylaws that
choose Delaware, as well as loser-pays bylaws, are justified by the
184. Id. at 955–56 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
185. Id. at 956.
186. One is reminded of Grant Gilmore’s astonishment at Oliver Wendell
Holmes: “The magician who could ‘objectify’ Raffles v. Wichelhaus . . . could, the
need arising, objectify anything.” GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 45
(Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995).
187. Fisch, supra note 3, at 389 (citing Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483,
492 (Del. Ch. 1995)).
188. See, e.g., Salazar v. Citadel Commc’ns Corp., 2004-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 135
N.M. 447, 90 P.3d 466 (“Under general New Mexico contract law, an agreement
that is subject to unilateral modification or revocation is illusory and
unenforceable . . . . The party that reserves the right to change the agreement
unilaterally, and at any time, has not really promised anything at all and should
not be permitted to bind the other party.”).
189. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 3, at 374.

W05_HAYDEN-AUTHOR CORRECTIONS

546

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

9/21/2018 1:14 PM

[Vol. 53

corporate contract; in contrast, bylaws that require corporations to
reimburse reasonable proxy solicitation expenses are not.190
Ultimately, the corporate contract between shareholders and the
corporation is a system of governance, not a contract. The metaphor
of contract blurs the picture, rather than illuminating it. Resolving
whether shareholders or boards should have the authority to pass
certain kinds of bylaws is a governance issue. The answers to these
puzzles are not to be found in the realm of offer, acceptance,
consideration, and the parol evidence rule.
IV. CORPORATION AS FIRM AND THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE
It is strange to see the amount of intellectual energy poured into
the flawed nexus of contracts metaphor, especially when the whole
idea of a corporation is to differentiate it from the world of contracts.
Yes, the individual participants may contract with one another as
part of their relationships within the corporation. But we have the
corporate form to distinguish the organization and its set of
relationships from the market and from general contractual relations.
The corporate form, and its family of other business associations,
were created to allow for a sustained approach to joint production.191
There is in fact a branch of economics that is devoted to exploring
the differences between firms and market-based transactions. This
research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a fundamental
question: Why do we even have firms at all? The function of markets
is to allocate resources based on the best information available at the
time.192 Firms, however, operate outside of this market structure,
standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”193
The law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are
generally governed by contract, while firms are created as specific
business organizations—partnerships, corporations, LLCs, among
others. Why have we created the non-market, non-contractual
entities in the first place? Why not just rely on markets and contracts
for everything?

190. Cf. id. at 382–83 (noting the inconsistency).
191. William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521 (1982) (suggesting that “the most useful way
to analyze the modern business enterprise is to interpret the terms of the
economic arrangements of a firm (partnership, corporation, cooperative) and the
terms of the related economic arrangements that should not be analyzed
separately from the firm (distributorship, loan agreement, employment
contracts) as a series of bargains subject to constraints and made in
contemplation of a long-term relationship”).
192. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
519, 520 (1945).
193. Coase, supra note 7, at 388 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF
INDUSTRY 85 (1930)).
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Early economists did not seek to answer this question, but rather
relied on a placeholder to serve their modeling needs.194 The firm was
simply a black box that took in inputs and put out outputs.195 The
first modern effort to inquire into the nature of firms was The Nature
of the Firm.196 In that article, Coase framed the issue in this manner:
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the
market.
Within a firm these market transactions are
eliminated, and in place of the complicated market structure
with
exchange
transactions
is
substituted
the
entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production. It is clear
that these are alternative methods of coordinating production.
Yet, having regard to the fact that, if production is regulated by
price movements, production could be carried on without any
organization at all, well we might ask, why is there any
organization?197

For Coase, the answer is transaction cost economics: organizing
production through a market creates transaction costs that a firm can
avoid.198 Since the firm consisted of managers and workers, the heart
of the firm was the relationship between these two groups. It was the
firm’s ability to manage workers outside of a market that solved
significant pricing and contracting expenses. As he argued, “it is the
fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer
and employee’” as well as the concept of the firm itself.199
Although the field started slowly, the theory of the firm made
significant advancements beginning in the 1970s. Armen Alchian
and Harold Demsetz developed a concept of team production that
explained the firm not as a way of providing command and control but
as a way of pooling disparate inputs into a system of cooperative
creation.200 They defined team production as “production in which (1)
several types of resources are used and (2) the product is not a sum of
separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”201 Firms are able to
coordinate production among various groups without carving the

194. See Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the
Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 757 (2006); Edward B. Rock & Michael
L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001).
195. Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462
(2005) (“The predominant model of microeconomics, neoclassical price theory,
assumes simply that the firm is a black box that maximizes profitability.”).
196. Coase, supra note 7, at 386.
197. Id. at 388.
198. Id. at 390–92.
199. Id. at 404.
200. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
201. Id. at 779.
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relationships into separable contracts.202 As a result, firms are used
when the team method increases productivity, after factoring out the
costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the various
players.203 Under Alchian and Demsetz’s model, the primary concern
of team production is making sure that the team members do not
shirk their responsibilities to the team.204 The inability to measure
individual contributions to productivity is what makes the firm useful
in the first place, but it is also the firm’s central governance
problem.205 As a result, an independent monitor is necessary to
ensure that the team members all contribute appropriately and are
rewarded appropriately. That central monitor is the firm itself.206
Around the same time of Alchian and Demsetz’s work, Oliver
Williamson was continuing to develop Coase’s “transaction-costs”
model into a robust field of research. Williamson used the theory of
the firm to identify the types of contractual difficulties that are likely
to lead to firm governance rather than market solutions.207 When
contributions and compensation are harder to value individually, the
parties will be left with incomplete and ambiguous contracts. And
these contracts will be insufficient to properly allocate economic
power within the relationship, particularly where one or both of the
parties must invest significant resources in assets specific to the
particular firm, project, or transaction.
In order to prevent
opportunism in the face of these contracts, some system of governance
is necessary to deal with ex ante developments. Firms can provide
this governance. By creating legal structures that allocate control
between the parties separate and apart from their contractual rights,
governments can assist parties in developing relationships that
minimize transaction costs and facilitate economic growth.208
The property-rights theory of the firm focuses more particularly
on the assets that the parties seek to use together. This theory,
developed in a series of articles by Grossman, Hart, and Moore, posits
that firms serve as a repository of property rights for assets used in
joint production.209 By owning the property outright, the firm
prevents the tragedy of the commons210 (in which no one holds
202. Id. at 780.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 779.
206. Id. at 794.
207. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 2
(1985).
208. Id. at 18.
209. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995);
Grossman & Hart, supra note 120, at 716; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119,
1121 (1990).
210. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–
45 (1968).
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property rights over valuable assets) as well as the problem of the
anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up among too
many disparate actors).211 The Grossman-Hart-Moore model dictates
that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most
valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise.212
While these types of contributors are crucial to the firm’s success, they
are also the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint
enterprise moves forward in time.213 Building on the property-rights
theory of the firm, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have proposed
an “access” theory of power within the firm.214 This model defines a
firm “both in terms of unique assets (which may be physical or
human) and in terms of the people who have access to these assets.”215
The power of the individuals within and without the firm is based on
their relative access to the assets, which Rajan and Zingales define as
“the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”216 Examples of
critical resources include machines, ideas, and people. As Rajan and
Zingales make clear, “[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the
resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is the
opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make
herself valuable.”217 Combined with her right to leave the firm, access
gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that she
controls: her specialized human capital.”218 Other research has
focused more specifically on the role of human capital. According to
the knowledge-based theory of the firm,219 a firm “develops the
knowledge it will use in its production process and the extent that
firm can bind this knowledge to its structure will influence its
organizational structure.”220 Rather than emphasize the ownership
211. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 1–22 (2008)
(describing the gridlock effects of disparate ownership that are characteristic of
the anticommons).
212. See generally Grossman & Hart, supra note 120.
213. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable
yet valuable contributors to the joint enterprise who have the most to fear from
opportunistic behavior. Indeed, Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency
of the transactions costs literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human
capital raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these
questions for corporate governance.” Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human
Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58,
66 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
214. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113
Q.J. ECON. 387, 387 (1998).
215. Id. at 390.
216. Id. at 388.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal
Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1139–40 (2007).
220. Id. at 1140.
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of physical assets, which can be fungible and non-specific, the
knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute,
and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the
firm. Similarly, another approach known as the capability-based
theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning
that can be translated into joint production.221
These theories of the firm do not lead to the inarguable conclusion
of shareholder primacy. In fact, Alchian and Demsetz specifically
question the very idea of shareholder governance:
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship
is one emanating from the division of ownership among several
people, or is it that the collection of investment funds from
people of various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the
latter, why should any of them be thought of as the owners in
whom voting rights, whatever they may signify or however
exercisable, should reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why
voting rights in any of the outside, participating investors? 222

The transaction costs and property rights theories do lend themselves
to a concern for shareholder protection. Both identify vulnerable
groups among those who provide inputs and attempt to create
structures that protect them from hold up or exploitation. But
compelling cases could also be made for employees, suppliers, and
customers as the parties who—in various types of situations—would
be the most vulnerable or most in need of protection from other
players.223
The nexus of contracts theory is something of an “anti-theory” of
the firm. It explains why firms are not necessary, rather than why
they exist. Unlike Alchian and Demsetz’s firm—which plays a real
role in shaping, executing, and enforcing contracts with input
providers—the “nexus” at the center of Jensen and Meckling’s firm is
a mere legal fiction that is “not an individual” and has no real
independent existence.224 Jensen and Meckling’s model focuses on
agency costs created by the upper-level managers who are tasked to
do the bidding of principals. Their theory defines agency costs as the
costs associated with monitoring by the principal, bonding
expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss.225 The monitoring
they describe looks a lot like the “control” that Coase focused on as
221. Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and
Work Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 135, 136 (2004).
222. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 200, at 789 n.14.
223. See generally Blair, supra note 213; David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In
and the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429 (2012) (arguing for
governance rights for customers, based on sunk costs and concerns over
opportunism).
224. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 105, at 311.
225. Id. at 308.
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the key element in defining the firm.226 But Jensen and Meckling
turn their attention to the relationship between shareholders
(principals) and management (agents), rather than the relationship
of employees to the firm. Their model joins the financial structure of
the firm with the management structure of corporate governance.
As other commentators have pointed out, the nexus of contract
theory is thus not really a theory of the firm at all. Rather, it is a
theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm—namely, the
corporation.227 And upon close examination, it falls apart, at least as
a theory of the firm, or as a justification for the corporation in the first
place. If a corporation is really no more than a nexus of contracts,
then there should be no need for corporations or corporate law. For if
firms are not necessary, there is no need for the law to create and
support them. As has been repeatedly recognized, the nexus of
contracts approach is not a theory of the firm because it “says nothing
about why firms exist or what kind of activity is undertaken by a
certain firm.”228
Stephen Bainbridge has drawn upon the theory of the firm and
public choice literature in creating his “director primacy” theory of the
corporation.229 Bainbridge’s model splits the theory of the firm
question into two components: What are the ends for which the
226. And indeed, Jensen and Meckling observe in a footnote: “As it is used in
this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing
the behavior of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to
‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation
policies, operating rules etc.” Id. at 308 n.9.
227. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1731,
1735 (2017); Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 727, 732 (2004); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms &
Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1624 (2001); David A.
Westbrook, Corporation Law after Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 105 n.277 (2003) (“So for Coase, in the first
instance, the firm is anything but a nexus of contracts. Instead the firm is a site
where the costs of continuous contracting (forming a market) outweigh the costs
of forming the entity. Ironies abound in the legal academy’s appreciation of the
great economist.”).
228. Meurer, supra note 227, at 731–32 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Theory
of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND
DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991)).
229. Bainbridge’s theory was developed over time through a series of articles
on the subject. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 573 (2003) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Director Primacy]. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case
for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Voting Rights]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791
(2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy in Takeovers]. He has synthesized his
research into a book on the subject. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
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corporation exists, and what are the means of achieving those
ends?230 For the theory of shareholder primacy, shareholders
represent both the ends and the means of governance.231 Bainbridge
agrees that the goal of the corporation should be shareholder wealth
maximization.232
He believes, however, that control of the
corporation rests not with the shareholders but rather with the board
of directors who serves as the “Platonic guardian” of the firm.233
Bainbridge’s theory is thus an amalgam of shareholder primacy
and nexus of contracts theory but with important differences. Rather
than saying that the firm is itself a nexus of contracts, he argues that
the firm has a nexus of its contracts, and that the board is that
nexus.234 According to Bainbridge, the defining characteristic of a
firm is “the existence of a central decision-maker vested with the
power of fiat.”235 Rather than being participatory democracies, firms
provide for hierarchies that can direct the allocation of resources
through command.236 Bainbridge bases his theory on Coase’s
differentiation between markets and firms, as well as the notion that
“firms arise when it is possible to lower these sets of costs inherent to
team production by delegating to a team member the power to direct
how the various inputs will be utilized by the firm.”237 Drawing upon
Arrow’s The Limits of Organization,238 Bainbridge contrasts
consensus-based decision-making structures with authority-based
structures, and argues that the corporation fits Arrow’s model of an
authority-based system.239 The board of directors serves as the
ultimate seat of authority—the central decision-maker that contracts
with all other players and directs them within the firm.
Bainbridge uses the theory of the firm literature to establish the
basics of his model (as a combination of contracts and hierarchy) and
then to defend its particular configuration of authority and purpose.
It is arguably a continuation of Coase’s original insight regarding
firms, further elaborated with the hypothetical bargain used in law
and economics analyses. Ultimately, however, Bainbridge fails to
flesh out his theory sufficiently to justify the near absolute control he
provides to the board. He repeatedly relies on Arrow’s contrast
between consensus and authority to resolve any questions of power

230. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 229, at 547–50.
231. Id. at 573 (“[S]hareholder primacy embraces two principles: (1) the
shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . and (2) the principle of ultimate
shareholder control.”).
232. Id. at 563.
233. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 33; Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra
note 229, at 550–51, 560 (also referring to the board as a “sui generis body”).
234. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 229, at 554–60.
235. Id. at 555.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 556 (citing to the “Coasean theory of the firm”).
238. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
239. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 229, at 557–58.
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allocation in favor of stronger authority. This move—characterized
by Brett McDonnell as Bainbridge’s “Arrowian moment”—is the crux
of his model.240 But as McDonnell points out, Arrow’s description of
the tradeoff between authority and accountability does not resolve all
policy questions in favor of authority.241 Ultimately, Arrow’s
dichotomy—and by extension, the director primacy model—is “not
able to tell us whether reform in favor of somewhat more
accountability at the expense of some, but far from total, loss in
authority is a good idea or not.”242
Moreover, there is nothing in Bainbridge’s theory that requires
the exclusive shareholder franchise.
Shareholder wealth
maximization is built into his model, but director primacy itself does
not need shareholders to be the only members of the electorate. If we
take the nexus of contracts model seriously, then any of the
contractual partners should have the right to bargain for
participation in the election of directors. Only by relying on the
hypothetical bargain can the shareholder franchise be justified. And
as noted above, this fictional agreement fails to justify the
shareholder franchise independently.
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout drew extensively from the theory
of the firm literature in developing their “team production” theory of
corporate law.243 Like nexus of contract and director primacy
theories, the team production model views the firm as a series of
relationships between various constituencies.244 These relationships
result in the joint production of goods or services. And as in director
primacy theory, the board of directors serves as the ultimate
authority when it comes to assigning responsibilities, mediating
disputes, and divvying up the profits.245 Unlike Bainbridge or
shareholder primacy theorists, however, Blair and Stout do not argue
that shareholder wealth maximization should be the goal of the
corporation. Instead, the corporation consists of all stakeholders who
are responsible for the business of the enterprise, and the directors
owe a duty to all of these participants in the corporate enterprise.246
According to the model, these stakeholders contribute their resources
to the enterprise with the implicit bargain that the enterprise itself
will fairly apportion the responsibilities and rewards. The board is
240. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A
Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 139, 143 (2009).
241. Id. at 161. McDonnell considers various arguments for Bainbridge’s
allocation of power but ultimately finds none of them to solve the dilemma. See
id. at 162–85.
242. Id. at 143.
243. Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 313.
244. Id. at 254 (stating that the team production approach is “consistent with
the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach”).
245. Id. at 251.
246. Id. at 253.
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hired by these stakeholders to serve as the apportioning body. The
board thus serves the stakeholders’ interests as a group, but it must
have authority over them in order to carry out its function.247
Blair and Stout’s team production model draws extensively on
the theory of the firm literature. Their analysis opens with the
question, “Why do firms exist?”248 and discusses the principal-agent
and property-rights approaches on its way to developing the team
production model.249 In focusing on the lateral interactions between
different stakeholders, Blair and Stout draw extensively upon the
work of Alchian and Demsetz in conceptualizing the firm as a method
for coordinating production.250 At the same time, they criticize that
model for taking “a potentially rich story about economic gains from
horizontal interaction among team members and, by reducing the
team members to interchangeable parts that make no firm-specific
investment, reformulat[ing] the team production problem as a
vertical principal-agent problem.”251 They then move on to consider
the works of Bengt Holmstrom,252 Jean Tirole,253 and Rajan and
Zingales254 in developing their own “team production” model of
corporate law. Their model emphasizes that the team in effect hires
the board, rather than the other way around, and that the team
members all plan to share in the fruits of the joint production. As
Blair and Stout describe it, “the public corporation is not so much a
‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as a ‘nexus of firm-specific
investments,’ in which several different groups contribute unique and
essential resources to the corporate enterprise, and who each find it
difficult to protect their contribution through explicit contracts.”255
The board serves as a group of “mediating hierarchs” who manage the
relationships of various corporate constituencies.256
Like Bainbridge, Blair and Stout endeavor for their model to
serve both descriptive and normative purposes.257 They argue that
the team production model better mirrors the law’s approach to the
corporation, as, in practice, directors are largely left alone to manage
the affairs of the corporation.258 Unlike director primacy, however,
the team production model requires the board to serve all
247. Id. at 280–81.
248. Id. at 257.
249. Id. at 257–61; see also id. at 261–65 (developing a “grand-design
principal-agent model,” which represents the conventional model of the firm).
250. Id. at 265 (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 200).
251. Id. at 267.
252. See generally Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J.
ECON. 324 (1982).
253. Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in
Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 181 (1986).
254. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 214.
255. Blair & Stout, supra note 87, at 275.
256. Id. at 250.
257. Id. at 289.
258. Id. at 287–319.
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stakeholders, rather than shareholders alone. They argue that this
is both a better description—as, in practice, boards balance concerns
among various constituencies—and a superior normative approach.
The team production model offers incentives for all members of the
team to participate, and thereby “more accurately captures the
fundamental contracting problem corporation law attempts to
resolve.”259
Lynn Stout has developed another approach to the corporate firm
with coauthor Tamara Belinfanti using systems theory.260 Stout and
Belinfanti argue that systems theory—a design and performance
assessment methodology used in engineering, biology, computer
science, and management science—better models the operation and
function of business entities. Rather than limiting the firm to one
undifferentiated whole, systems theory recognizes that independent
subparts interlock together to create the larger unit. These subparts
are distinct yet interconnected, and they operate together as a unit
over time to serve a given function or purpose.261 Studying a system
is thus comprised of an acknowledgement of the many subsystems
(and subsystems of subsystems) that make up the larger whole. A
subsystem may have a specific sub-purpose but still be committed
overall to the organization’s ultimate goals. Systems theorists would
be wary of a single metric that purported to demonstrate the success
of the entire organization—say, for example, share price.
Systems theory sounds a bit like a nexus of contracts; both
involve interwoven and overlapping layers of relationships between
various parties. Systems theory, however, recognizes that the firm is
not just a set of independent relationships; it is rather a set of
independent parts or groups that work together to serve a larger
whole. These parts may not “naturally” come together, as does an
agglomeration of contracts: there must be an overall structure that
works to harmonize the subsystems. Rather than trusting that
individual contracts will create a private order of maximal efficiency,
systems theory looks to understand how successful organizations
structure themselves to achieve that success.
Ultimately, these theories of the firm all fail to provide
independent support for the exclusive shareholder franchise. Coase
supports the idea of an internal hierarchy; Alchian and Demsetz
demonstrate the need for a central bargaining agent. Hart and
Moore, Rajan and Zingales, McInerney, and Gorges and Halberstam
259. Id. at 328. See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder
Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2071, 2115−16 (2010), for a critique of the exclusion of non-shareholder
representatives on Blair & Stout’s board of directors.
260. See generally Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The
Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 579 (2018).
261. Id. at 599. The management system “holacracy” applies an analogous
approach. BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR
A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 158–59 (2015).
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all puzzle through the importance of assets to the firm, and the firm’s
role in managing these assets. Blair and Stout and Bainbridge focus
on the role of the board in mediating the relationships between the
various stakeholders. But in none of these theories is the exclusive
shareholder franchise a critical part of what makes the corporation a
firm, and vice versa. Rather than justifying the shareholder
franchise, the theory of the firm literature is at best agnostic.
V. CONCLUSION
American corporations are the most powerful economic actors in
the modern world. They involve a coming together of labor, capital,
and a host of other stakeholder groups to produce most of the world’s
goods and services in ways that generate—and distribute—enormous
amounts of wealth. Their decision-making structures, then, are of
crucial importance. Most all of them share the same system of
governance, where shareholders elect directors who appoint officers,
and other constituents are restricted to more limited participation
rights through contract. This basic organizational structure, in which
shareholders alone ultimately control firm decision-making, both
reinforces and is reinforced by the doctrine of shareholder primacy,
and has become so entrenched in modern thinking about corporations
that it bears no mention in corporate law scholarship.
Over the years, this basic structure and the exclusive shareholder
franchise has been propped up by several different arguments,
including, most notably, the argument from the residual and the
argument from Arrow’s theorem. But over the past decade, as those
arguments have fallen by the wayside, corporate law scholars have
been forced to circle back to a final argument for the special voting
status of shareholders—that this fundamental feature of corporate
governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for
agreements among all corporate constituents. And because it reflects
the preferences of all parties to the corporate contract, it should be
viewed as the best way to structure the corporation.
This argument, though, has always been a slippery one, drifting
from reality to metaphor, bolstered by visions of hypothetical
bargains that always seem to do a better job reflecting the views of
particular groups of scholars than the desires of actual corporate
constituents. Does anyone really believe that workers think the best
way to structure a corporation is to hand over the entirety of firm
decision-making to shareholders? The whole notion of the corporation
as a nexus of contracts has been a theatrical production of dodges,
feints, and posturing designed to rationalize and justify the existing
order of things and used by corporate governance theorists to create
the kind of rhetorical space they need to advocate for their own
particular policy positions.
The nexus of contracts theory, it turns out, is both descriptively
wrong and normatively hollow, and as such provides a poor
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foundation for the exclusive shareholder franchise. The corporation
is neither a contract nor a set of contracts. Business organizations
(including corporations) are state law entities that have their own
legal personality and internal governance structure. Reducing
corporations to contractual components makes absolutely no
theoretical sense, literally, metaphorically, or otherwise. This final
argument for shareholder voting, and shareholder primacy more
generally, is built on a house of sand.
It is time now to do the hard work of starting over and
determining what the ideal structure or structures might be for
organizations that bring together capital and labor in a process of
joint production. The modern corporation has, in fact, achieved
amazingly powerful advances in technology and productivity. At the
same time, workers’ wages are stagnant, and the divide in income
inequality grows ever wider. Freed from the constraints of false
theories, it is time to reconsider the possibilities for our economic
organizations and the society that they help to shape.

